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Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 16690
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account
  Author(s):  Ali Hossein Khani
  Status:   To Appear
  Journal: Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review
  Supported by:  IPM
  Abstract:
I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do A is to make an all-out judgement that Aing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. I then explain how this account can help deal with various perplexities in Davidson's later view of meaning and mental content.

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