“School of Philosophy”
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| Paper IPM / Philosophy / 17249 |
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| Abstract: | |
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A Third-Person-Based Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject's mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Byrne, Child, and others have attributed such a view to Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based Judgment-Dependent account, such as Wright's, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the judgments of the subject herself, formed under certain optimal conditions. I will argue for two claims: (1) Attributing a Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account to Davidson is unjustified; Davidson's view is much closer to a First-Personal account. (2) The Third-Personal accounts rest on a misconstrual of the role of an interpreter in the First-Personal accounts.
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