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| Paper IPM / Philosophy / 14374 |
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| Abstract: | |
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Hale has argued that logical necessities are absolute in the sense that there is no competing kind of modality under which they may be false. In this paper, I argue that there are competing kinds of modality, which I call âessentialist modalities,â under which logical necessities may be false. Since it is counter-intuitive to say that logical necessities are not absolute, my argument, if correct, shows that Haleâs characterization of absolute necessity does not adequately capture the intuitive notion of absolute necessity. Then, a qualified version of Haleâs characterization of absolute necessity is proposed. On the qualified version, the absoluteness of logical necessities is no longer defeated by essentialist possibilities.
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